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Abstract. - We study co-evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma games where each player can imitate
both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability depen-
dent on the payoff difference when the player’s income is collected from games with the neighbors.
The players, located on the sites of a two-dimensional lattice, follow unconditional cooperation
or defection and use individual strategy adoption rule described by a parameter. If the system
is started from a random initial state then the present co-evolutionary rule drives the system to-
wards a state where only one evolutionary rule remains alive even in the coexistence of cooperative
and defective behaviors. The final rule is related to the optimum providing the highest level of
cooperation and affected by the topology of the connectivity structure.
The evolutionary game theory provides a general math-
ematical framework for the investigation of multi-agent
systems used widely in biology, economy and other so-
cial sciences [1–3]. In these systems we have an extremely
large freedom in the definition of models giving the set of
strategies (states or species), the interaction (payoff ma-
trix), the connectivity structure (varied from lattice to
scale-free network), and dynamical rules. Due to the large
number of possibilities the complete exploration of these
systems requires a long time because we need to deter-
mine separately the effect of all the mentioned ingredients
of the model on the system behavior. To overcome this
difficulty, the introduction of dynamical rules when not
only the strategy changes but also other individual feature
of players [4] may reveal the relevant region of parameter
space that is important to study. During simultaneous
evolutions (briefly co-evolution) of variables the success-
driven Darwinian selection can serve as a general tool to
identify the characteristic dynamical rules. The goal of
this letter to demonstrate that the fixation of a crucial
parameter is possible and the resulting value is in close
connection to the state where cooperation is the largest
that can be achieved at the corresponding payoff elements
and topology.
The systematic investigation of the evolutionary Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD) games has attracted a considerable
effort in the last decades because these models can de-
scribe the ways how the cooperative behavior is main-
tained among selfish individuals [5]. Originally the PD is
a two-person one-shot game [2, 3] where the players have
two options (cooperation or defection) to choose and their
income depends on their choices. The rank of possible pay-
offs enforces both (intelligent and selfish or rational) play-
ers to choose defection yielding the second worst income
for each while the mutual cooperation provides higher in-
come for both players. The situation is changed drasti-
cally in the multi-agent systems where the player’s income
comes from repeated games with the neighbors defined
by a connectivity structure (lattice with nearest neighbor
connections or other graphs). The evolutionary games are
the combination of the multi-agent repeated games and
Darwinian selection. Namely, sometimes the players are
allowed to modify their strategy by imitating one of the
more successful neighbors (in biological context: an off-
spring of the more successful species will be substituted
for a less successful one).
It turned out that the cooperative behavior can be sus-
tained among the spatially arranged players with local in-
teractions [6] for a wide range of evolutionary (here imi-
tation) rules even if they can follow only one of the two
simplest strategies: unconditional cooperation or defec-
tion. Subsequent investigations have clarified the main ef-
fect of payoffs, connectivity structure (including networks
with inhomogeneous degree distribution), and noise on the
level of cooperation (for a survey see [3,7]). These investi-
gations highlighted a mechanism supporting the coopera-
tion efficiently in more realistic models where the number
of neighbors varies within a wide region [8, 9] or the indi-
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viduals have different personal strategy pass capability to
help the imitation of their own strategy [10,11]. Evidently,
the enhancement of the strategy set (e.g., the application
of stochastic reactive strategies [12], deterministic strate-
gies of finite memory [13], and Q-learning strategies [14])
opened further dimensions towards the ways supporting
cooperation.
The simultaneous evolution (henceforth co-evolution) of
strategies and another feature of the model was investi-
gated previously by many authors. First the co-evolution
of strategy distribution and connectivity structure was
studied (for examples see [15–21]). The co-evolution of
the strategy distribution and inhomogeneous capability of
strategy transfer was also investigated in the last years
[22,23]. In another model the individuals were allowed to
have different payoff matrices that can be adopted (imi-
tated) together with the strategy, too [24, 25]. Very re-
cently, van Segbroeck et al. [26, 27] have introduced a
co-evolutionary PD game where the players are capable
to modify their connection in different ways and in par-
allel with the strategy adoption they can also imitate
the neighbor’s method used later in the rearrangement
of their own neighborhood. Finally we have to mention
that the co-evolution of strategy and individual learning
(evolutionary) rule was investigated previously for some
cases [28–30]. For example, Moyano and Sanchez [31] have
studied the cases when the players adopt the strategy and
dynamical rule from the better player if two strategies and
two rules are allowed.
Now we extend a previous model [32] to study what
happens when the players can adopt not only the more
prosperous strategy but the way of strategy adoption as
well. The present set of strategy imitation rules is based
on pairwise comparison of payoffs between two neighbor-
ing players chosen at random. We assume that initially the
players use different rules giving the probability of strategy
adoption as a function of payoff difference divided by an
individual parameter resembling the temperature in the
Fermi-Dirac distribution function. It will be shown that
the suggested co-evolutionary process drives the system
towards a final state where all the players use the same im-
itation rule even if their strategies are different. The state
characterized by the fixed selection (learning) rule is close
to the highest cooperativity (optimum) state that can be
achieved applying the corresponding payoff elements and
topology. As the optimum level of cooperation depends
on the connectivity structure [32, 33] therefore our inves-
tigation is performed on both the square and kagome lat-
tices representing two different classes of behaviors. These
systems will be investigated by Monte Carlo (MC) simula-
tions and an extended version of the dynamical mean-field
approximation.
In the present model the players located on the sites x of
a two dimensional lattice can follow either unconditional
cooperation or defection strategies, in short, sx = C or
D. The players’ income (Px) come from one-shot games
with the four nearest neighbors. Following the suggestion
of Nowak and May [34] we use a re-scaled payoff matrix of
the so-called weak PD game, i. e., the cooperative player
receives 1 or 0 if the co-player follows C or D strategies
while the defective player is rewarded by b (1 < b < 2) or 0
if the opponent cooperates or defects. Initially, each player
follows a strategy (sx = C or D) chosen at random. Be-
sides it we assume that the players use different imitation
rules characterized by a parameter Kx chosen randomly
from a set of possible values {K1, . . . ,Kn} (as it will be
detailed later on). In each subsequent elementary step of
the evolutionary process we choose two neighboring play-
ers (x and y) at random, we determine their payoff Px and
Py, and player x adopts the strategy sy and imitation rule
(characterized by Ky) with a probability
W =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/Kx]
(1)
in two (independent) consecutive processes. More pre-
cisely, we generate two random numbers (0 < r1, r2 < 1),
and sx → sy if r1 < W and Kx → Ky if r2 < W . This
means that probably both the strategy and imitation rule
are adopted if Py − Px ≫ Kx. Evidently, there exist el-
ementary steps when either sy or Ky or none is adopted.
As a consequence of independent processes the imitation
of the imitation rule is possible even if the strategies are
the same (sx = sy). These dynamical rules imply the ex-
istence of absorbing states with uniform strategies and/or
rules where the evolution is stopped separately. We should
note, however, that qualitatively similar results were ob-
served when imitation of rules was only possible if players
have different strategies.
The individual parameter Kx of player x can be inter-
preted in different ways [7, 35]. On the one hand we can
think that in realistic systems the payoff matrix describes
the average payoff and the current payoffs should be mod-
ified by a stochastic term as it is modelled by Perc [36]
and Traulsen et al. [37]. The noisy term can be caused by
the fluctuating environment, cognitive mistakes, etc. For
a suitable probability distribution of the stochastic con-
tribution, the deterministic imitation of the better player
can yield a strategy adoption rule similar to those given
by (1). In that case Kx characterizes the amplitude of
noise. On the other hand, the personal decision of players
can also involve stochastic elements reflecting their free-
dom to not accept the better strategy or even to follow
the worse one (for the latter interpretation Kx denotes
the average amount of payoff what player x hazards when
looking for a better solution).
The evolutionary process is governed by repeating the
mentioned elementary steps that drive the system towards
a final state described by the average portion ρ of coop-
erators and the distribution of Kx. If initially the players
use a uniform rule (Kx = K, for ∀x) then this system be-
comes equivalent to those studied previously [32]. In that
case we can distinguish three regions of b dependent on
K. If b < bc1(K) then only cooperators remain alive after
a transient period. On the contrary, only defectors will
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survive in the final state when b > bc2(K). Within the
intermediate region [bc1(K) < b < bc2(K)] the stationary
value of ρ decreases from 1 to 0 if b is increased.
First we study the present model on the square lattice
where both bc1(K) and bc2(K) goes to 1 if K tends to ei-
ther zero or infinity. Besides it, there exists an optimum
value of K where bc2(K) reaches its maximum. A one-
peak profile (for an example see Fig. 31 in [7]) can be ob-
served when evaluating ρ as a function of the homogeneous
K for fixed b if 1 < b < max[bc2(K)]. In the latter case
we can introduce two threshold values of K in a way that
cooperators die out if K < Kc1(b) or K > Kc2(b). Within
the intermediate region of K [Kc1(b) < K < Kc2(b)] the
C and D strategies coexist for the given uniform rule.
As the above investigations [32] have also indicated that
the relaxation time diverges if K → 0 or ∞ therefore the
undesired consequences of this effect was avoided by in-
troducing additional constraints, namely, all Ki > Kmin
(typically Kmin = 0.001). On the other hand, several runs
have justified that rules with high Kx die out fast, there-
fore the initial set of Ki has also been limited from above
(typically Kmax = 2) and n is varied from 2 to 200 for
sake of simplicity.
Let us discuss the trivial situations when the play-
ers have different Kx parameters in the initial state but
their value exceeds the second threshold value, that is
Kx > Kc2(b) for ∀x. After some time only defectors re-
main alive (sx = D) with a preference of lower Ki. When
cooperator strategies become extinct all players receives
the same payoff, Px = 0, and the further evolution of
rules (Kx) can be well described by the voter model (for a
survey see [38]) with a large number of candidates. This
means that one can observe growing domains of players
with the same rules and the typical domain size increases
with the logarithm of time in the two-dimensional sys-
tems. The same phenomenon is found if Kx < Kc1(b)
for ∀x as well as for the combination of the latter two
cases when there is no Kx within the intermediate region
[Kc1(b) < Kx < Kc2(b)] in the initial state.
The final state of the co-evolutionary process changes
drastically if initially there are several players with im-
itation rules belonging to the coexistence region for the
homogeneous cases, i.e., Kc1(b) < Kx < Kc2(b). The MC
simulations have indicated clearly that after a relaxation
period all the players use the same imitation rule. The
Darwinian selection chooses the rule Ki ∈ {K1, . . . ,Kn}
that has the ”minimum distance” from a fixation value
Kf(b). The quotation mark refers to a possible asymme-
try between the two sides, however, the estimation of its
magnitude is prevented by the statistical error. Appar-
ently the Darwinian selection favors a rule Ki providing
the highest average payoff (as it occurs for population dy-
namics) here, however, the value of Kf (b) does not co-
incide the values of K exhibiting local maximum in ρ or
average payoff (in general the difference between the latter
two quantities is smaller than our statistical error compa-
rable to symbol size). Figure 1 demonstrates the fixation
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Fig. 1: The MC results on the square lattice for the fixation
values are denoted by closed squares within the coexistence
region bounded by the solid line (bc2(K)). Open circles show
the position of local maximum in the ρ portion of cooperators.
Dotted lines are just to guide the eye.
values within the coexistence region and also the position
of local maximum of ρ used frequently to quantify the co-
operativity in the whole society.
Naturally, the fixation time depends on the system size
L, the initial set of Ki values, and also the number (n) of
different values. It turned out that for sufficiently large
system sizes (200 < L) the selected rule becomes indepen-
dent of the initial configuration and sequence of random
numbers. The efficiency of the accurate determination of
Kf(b) could be improved significantly if only two rules
were allowed in the initial state as detailed below.
As mentioned above the topological feature of the
connectivity structure influences the qualitative behav-
ior (phase diagram) in the evolutionary PD games [32].
On the kagome lattice overlapping triangles support the
spreading of cooperative behavior in the low noise limit.
For homogeneous imitation rules the upper boundary of
the coexistence region (bc2(K)) decreases monotonously
from 3/2 to 1 if K increases from 0 to ∞ [33]. This be-
havior implies the possibility that here the Darwinian se-
lection of rules (within the coexistence region) favors the
lowest values of Ki referring to Kf(b) = 0. This behavior
has indeed been justified by MC simulations if b exceeds
a threshold value (b > bth = 1.182(2)). For low values of
b we have found a behavior resembling those observed on
square lattice.
Figure 2 shows the K-dependence of ρ (for homoge-
neous rules Kx = K if b = 1.17) in a magnified plot to
emphasize the existence of two local maxima separated by
a shallow local minimum. If the co-evolutionary system
is started from a state with many rules inside the coexis-
tence region then only one rule (the corresponding Kf(b)
is denoted by the vertical dotted line in Fig. 2) will remain
alive in a way as described above. There exists, however,
a relevant difference in the behaviors between the square
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Fig. 2: Portion of cooperators as a function homogeneous
Kx = K for b = 1.17 on the kagome lattice. The MC re-
sults are illustrated by a solid line because the statistical error
is comparable to the line thickness. The horizontal arrows in-
dicate that the system can evolve towards the fixation value
Kf (b) (denoted by dotted vertical line) through weak muta-
tions. At the same time the weak mutations drives the system
towards a state where Kx → 0 if initially each Kx is smaller
than a threshold value denoted by the dashed vertical line.
and kagome lattices. Namely, on the kagome lattice two
attractors (final imitation rules) can be observed. The
horizontal arrows in Fig. 2 illustrate the direction of pref-
erence if initially the players follow rules from the marked
intervals. The result of these types of investigations can
be interpreted as the direction of evolution in Kx through
rare and weak mutations. Although the state of Kx = 0
∀x has a finite basin of attraction through a weak muta-
tion this state is overcome by the offspring of players of
Kf(b) being present initially.
The MC results for arbitrary values of b are summa-
rized in Fig. 3 where the cases of Kf (b) ≃ 0 are denoted
by several closed squares positioned at Kmin (instead of
0) used to avoid the above mentioned technical difficul-
ties. In these cases the MC simulations have indicated
a plateau (within the statistical error) in the values of ρ
and average payoff. If the value of b is decreased gradually
then an abrupt change of Kf(b) is found at b = bth. Below
this threshold value there appears a positive Kf (b) that
can also be related to the local maxima in the portion of
cooperators. Notice that Kf (b) correlates weakly with the
position of the second (right) local maximum of ρ (see Fig.
2) if b < bth. The height of the second local maximum de-
creases monotonously if b is increased and this local peak
vanishes above a value larger than bth.
As mentioned, the selected rule (Kf (b)) can be deter-
mined more efficiently if we consider the competitions be-
tween only two suitable imitation rules. This approach
can also be utilized in the extended version of dynami-
cal cluster techniques (for a brief survey see [7]) where
we derive a set of equations of motion for the probabil-
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Fig. 3: Fixation values Kf (b) for the competing imitation rules
on the kagome lattice are illustrated by closed squares. Open
squares indicate the position of separatrix indicated by dashed
line in Fig. 2. Solid line represents the maximum values of
b where cooperators can survive for homogeneous rules. Open
circles show the position of local maxima of ρ within the coexis-
tence region. The insert compares the prediction (solid line) of
an extended version of the three-site dynamical cluster method
with the results (symbols) of MC simulations.
ity of each (strategy and rule) configuration existing on a
given cluster of sites. The accuracy of this method can
be improved by choosing larger clusters. Previous investi-
gations [32] have justified that the three-site (triangular)
cluster of the kagome lattice is the smallest one that gives
adequate description about all the relevant features for
homogeneous rules. This fact has raised the possibility to
extend this technique for the two-rule cases. The details
of this method will be published elsewhere, now we only
compare its prediction with the MC results in the insert of
Fig. 3. Noteworthy that this method predicts a little bit
higher threshold value for the payoff parameter b, namely,
b
(3s)
th = 1.219(2), and confirms the difference between the
selected rule and local maxima both in ρ and average pay-
off.
In summary, the Darwinian selection (imitation of the
better) proved to be beneficial for the whole society for
the Prisoner’s Dilemma if not only the strategy but also
the way of strategy adoption is adopted from a successful
neighboring player. The systematic investigations high-
light the relevance of the selected dynamical rules that,
depending on the connectivity structure and payoff, pro-
vides the highest or almost the highest possible average in-
come. The small difference between the selected and the
optimal dynamical rules might have been related to the
spatial effects enhancing the importance of fluctuations.
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